Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

State of Utah vs. Sonja Swanson : Amicus Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Janet C Grahm; Attoney General.
R. Clayton Huntsman; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Utah v. Sonja Le Swanson, No. 930160 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5034

This Brief of Amicus Curiae is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court
of Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH

coyer

OF Appr
ERiE'F

l' T 4H

DOCKET NO.

°l30llfi0
IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff fie
Appellee
v.

Appellate Court No.
930160-CA

SONJA LE SWANSON,
Defendant &
Appellant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH FOUNDATION
AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT
BY THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
THE HON. JAMES L. SHUMATE, JUDGE PRESIDING
JANET C. GRAHM, ESQ.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

KATHRYN D. KENDELL, ESQ,
#9 Exchange Place, #419
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for the Plaintiff/Appellee

Attorney for Amicus
Curiae American Civil
Liberties Union of
Utah Foundation

R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN, ESQ.
2 West St. George Boulevard
Suite 31
St. George, Utah 84770
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant

\m 1 8 1934

OEO 2 3 1993

COURT OF APPE A L S
IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff &
Appellee
v.

:
::

SONJA LE SWANSON,
Defendant &
Appellant.

\
j
j

Appellate Court No.
930160-CA

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH FOUNDATION
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT;
This is an appeal from a final judgment and sentence entered
in a state district court in Utah.

Accordingly, the Utah Court

of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2((f)).
However, because of the nature of this case, and the broad
scope of remedy sought, and for other good cause, Appellant has
respectfully suggested that the Utah Court of Appeals may desire
to certify this case to the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(3), as amended.

IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff &
Appellee
v.

Appellate Court No,
930160-CA

SONJA LE SWANSON,
Defendant &
Appellant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH FOUNDATION
AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT
BY THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
THE HON. JAMES L. SHUMATE, JUDGE PRESIDING
JANET C. GRAHM, ESQ.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Appellee
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN, ESQ.
2 West St. George Boulevard
Suite 31
St. George, Utah 84770
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant

KATHRYN D. KENDELL, ESQ,
#9 Exchange Place, #419
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Amicus
Curiae American Civil
Liberties Union of
Utah Foundation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE NO.
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE

1

STATEMENT OF CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

3

ARGUMENTS

4

I.

II.

III.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, § 12 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
COMPROMISED IF COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION IS
TAINTED BY CONFLICT

4

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND A CONFLICT
BASED ON DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OFFICE SHARING
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ATTORNEYS WHO
PERFORMED PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
VIOLATED THE MANDATE OF STATE V. BROWN THAT
DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD POSSESS UNDIVIDED
LOYALTY TO HIS CLIENT
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO SWANSON'S
CURRENT COUNSEL IS APPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF
WASHINGTON COUNTY'S BREACH OF IT'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO APPOINT EFFECTIVE AND
CONFLICT FREE COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT
DEFENDANT'S PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
§ 77-32-1

CONCLUSION

16
17

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND GENERAL AUTHORITY
PAGE NO.
American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
357 (1990)

12

Constitution of Utah Article I, § 12

4, 17

Transcript March 12, 1993, pg. 38, In. 4-6

9, 11,
14
3,5,
6, 7,
10, 17

United States Constitution Amend. VI

Utah Bar Committee on Professional
Ethics Op. 34 (1976)

13, 15

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1(4) (1992)
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.10 (1992) . . .

4, 8,
16
. 11, 14,
15

Wren, H.G. & B.J. Glasock, The of Counsel AgreementA Guide for Law Firm and Practitioner, ABA
Senior Lawyers Division (1991)

12

CASE LAW

Bicas

v. Superior

Court

and Kahn,

567 P.2d 1198 (Az.

App. 1977)

8

Gideon

v.

Wainwright,

People

v.

Grisby,

Smith
State

v.
v.

Strickland

372 U.S. 335 (1963)
365 N.E. 2d 481 (111. App. 1st 1977).

Whatcott,
757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985) . . .
Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992)

v.

Washington,

668 U.S. 466 (1983)
ii

4, 5,
6, 7
7
4,
9,
11,
15,
18
5,

8,
10,
14,
17,
6

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff &
Appellee
v.

:
:
::
::

SONJA LE SWANSON,
Defendant &
Appellant.

J

Appellate Court No.
930160-CA

:

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH FOUNDATION
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY
This Brief of Amicus

Curiae,

American Civil Liberties Union

of Utah Foundation, Inc. is filed pursuant to Rule 25, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, by leave of the Court and consent of
defendant/appellant.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Amicus

Curiae

will focus on the following issues: (1) The

ruling of the trial court failed to recognize the seminal
significance of the right to impartial and loyal counsel
uncompromised by an actual or perceived conflict;

and (2) The

ruling of the trial court failed to recognize the existence of a
disqualifying conflict when appointed defense counsel maintained
an "of counsel"

or office sharing relationship with law partners

who had prosecutorial responsibilities and who made supervisory

and funding decisions regarding the office of the county
prosecutor and county public defender.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant, Sonja Swanson, (hereinafter "Swanson") appeals
from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, by the Fifth
Judicial District Court, Washington County, State of Utah, the
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding.
On January 13, 1993, Swanson was arrested in her home
pursuant to a search warrant.

The search uncovered

methamphetamine in her purse.

At the Information hearing, the

trial court determined that Swanson was indigent and appointed J.
MacAurther Wright as Appellant's public defender ("Counsel").

At

the time of his appointment, Counsel maintained and testified to
maintaining an "of counsel" and/or office sharing relationship
with other lawyers who had prosecutorial responsibilities in
Washington County.

Moreover, a senior attorney in counsel's

office was and still is a Washington County Commissioner with
supervisory and funding responsibility over the office of the
Washington County Prosecutor and the Washington County Public
Defender.

Swanson, on the advice of her appointed Counsel

entered into a plea agreement.

Subsequent to the trial court's

approval of the plea agreement and imposition of sentence,
2

Swanson sought the advice of new counsel, Clayton Huntsman.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amicus

Curiae,

American Civil Liberties Union of Utah

Foundation, Inc., adopts the facts as set forth in Appellant's
brief filed with this court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The ruling of the trial court that Swanson1s

representation was not compromised by the conflicts between
Swanson's counsel and the other lawyers in his office failed to
fully consider the importance of the Right to Counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment which requires that counsel's
representation be meaningful and effective.

The right to

effective counsel is undermined when counsel has divided loyalty
as demonstrated or presumed based on counsel's "of counsel" or
office sharing relationship with lawyers in his office who had
prosecutorial responsibilities.
II.

Swanson's counsel maintained a relationship as "of

counsel" and/or office sharing with a law firm whose partners had
prosecutorial responsibilities in the town of Ivins, located in
Washington County.

Moreover, a senior partner in the law firm

with whom counsel maintained his "of counsel" relationship was
and still is a Washington County Commissioner with supervisory
and funding responsibility over the offices of the Washington
3

County Prosecutor and Public Defender.

These factors created an

impermissible and disqualifying conflict and severely compromised
the undivided loyalty required by The Utah Supreme Court in
v.

Brown,
III.

State

853 P.2d 851 (1993).
Utah Code § 77-32-1 provides that a county is

responsible to assure indigent defendant's receive "undivided
loyalty" of counsel.

An award of attorney's fees to Swanson's

current counsel is appropriate in view of Washington County's
breach of it's responsibility to appoint effective and conflict
free counsel for indigent defendants.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I. S 12 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY COMPROMISED IF
COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION IS TAINTED BY CONFLICT.

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
an accused shall have "the assistance of counsel for his
defense." U.S. Const. Amemdment VI.

The Utah Constitution

Article I, § 12 likewise guarantees the right: "In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel..." In Gideon

v.

Wainwright,

372

U.S. 335 (1963), the United States Supreme Court addressed the
importance of the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal
proceedings.

"[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not

luxuries". Id. at 344.

The adversarial system's effectiveness is
4

protected by the Sixth Amendment's requirement that the accused
have an advocate in court.

If the criminal justice system is to

produce fair and reliable results, then partisan advocacy must be
available to each of the parties involved.
In Gideon,

the Supreme Court specifically recognized the

importance of appointed counsel for the indigent.

"[A]ny person

hailed into court, who is too poor to have a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id.
Unlike those accused who can afford the most competent attorney
to confront their accuser and prepare their defense, the indigent
cannot receive the full protection contemplated by the Sixth
Amendment absent governmental intercedence on their behalf.
Those who intercede, however, owe no less a duty to the indigent
than the attorney who commands and receives top dollar for her
services.

The criminal justice system's goal of providing equal,

fair, and just results depends upon both sides zealously engaging
in the adversarial process.

"This noble ideal cannot be realized

if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him." Id. at 344.
While Gideon

confirmed the Sixth Amendment right to the

assistance of counsel, later Supreme Court decisions found the
right an empty one absent effective assistance of counsel.
Strickland

v.

Washington,

In

466 U.S. 668 (1983), the Supreme Court
5

noted that counsel's presence in itself was not enough:
[t]hat a person who happens to be a lawyer is present
at trial alongside the accused is not enough to satisfy
the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment
recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to
produce just results. An accused is entitled to be
assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed,
who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial
is fair.
Id. at 685.
of counsel.
under

The Sixth Amendment requires affirmative assistance
reasonable

This assistance is measured by what is

prevailing

professional

norms.

Id. at 688 (emphasis added).

In other words, if a defendant presents facts which demonstrate
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness or that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced
the defense, a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred.
The most basic duty of counsel is to provide undivided
loyalty to the client. Strickland
692 (1983).

v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668,

The United States Supreme Court has found divided

loyalty of counsel to be a prima facie evidence of
ineffectiveness of counsel. Id.

After the defendant shows an

actual conflict of interest, then prejudice is presumed.
Other state courts concur in the importance of effective
representation untainted by conflict.

In People

v.

Grisby,

N.E. 2d 481 (111. App. 1st 1977), the court noted that "an
attorney owes his client undivided allegiance, and this is
6

3 65

particularly true of an attorney representing a person accused of
crime.

Where an attorney's loyalty to a defendant in a criminal

case is diluted by that attorney's obligation to others, the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel is not satisfied." Id. at 484.

In the Grisby

case the

court held that a co-counsel who represented the complaining
witness against the defendant in another matter was unable to
render effective assistance of counsel.

The Illinois court noted

that in a criminal case where a defense attorney has a possible
conflict of interest he should not participate in the defense
even though "no actual prejudice to the defendant as a result of
the conflict is, or can be shown." Id.

According to the court

"the significant inquiry is not whether the attorney concurrently
represents two clients with inconsistent positions but whether a
potential conflict of interest exists." Id.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held in Smith

v. Whatcott,

757

F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985), that an entire firm was disqualified
from representing defendants due to one attorney's

prior

representation of plaintiff in a related criminal action,
notwithstanding the fact that no information had actually been
disclosed, or access to files permitted to that attorney.
Central to the court's holding was the fact that no evidence had
been presented to indicate that the firm in question had in place
7

"specific institutional mechanisms" to block the flow of
confidential information. Id. at

1101.

Undergirding the court's

opinion was a recognition of the importance of protecting client
confidentiality and avoiding any appearance of impropriety. Id.
at 1100.
Kahn,

This view was echoed in Bicas

567 P.2d 1198 (Az. App. 1977).

v.

Superior

In Bicas

Court

and

the court noted

that an attorney must avoid "not only the fact, but even the
appearance of representing conflicting interests." Jd. at 1202.
Against the backdrop of these philosophical underpinnings, firmly
rooted in our system of justice, the Utah Supreme Court issued
it's opinion in State

v.

Brown,

853 P.2d 851 (Ut. 1992).

There,

the Court held that appointment of a part-time prosecutor as
defense counsel constituted an inherent conflict of interest and
warranted a new trial.

The Court relied on Utah's criminal code

requirement that lawyers who defend indigent defendants "assure
undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client". Id. at 856.
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1(4) (1992)).

The Brown

Court

held that because of counsel's part-time prosecutor position
"defendant's right to the undivided loyalty of counsel was
jeopardized", id. at 859.

The Brown

Court held that a case-by-

case inquiry to prove prejudice is "unnecessary and ill-advised"
Id.

To remedy the inherent injustice which occurs in dual

representation cases, the Utah Supreme Court announced "a per se

8

rule of reversal wherever such dual representation is undertaken
so as to prevent its recurrence." Id.

The Brown

per se rule

arose based on the Court's open acknowledgment of the critical
importance of defense counsel's undivided loyalty to his/her
client.

That loyalty is impermissibly compromised when defense

counsel maintains an "of counsel" or office sharing
relationship1 with lawyers who have prosecutorial functions in
the same county as the public defender and when a senior partner
oversees the funding of defense counsel's public defender
contract.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND A CONFLICT
BASED ON DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OFFICE SHARING OR OF COUNSEL
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ATTORNEYS WHO PERFORMED
PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES VIOLATED THE MANDATE OF

1

The trial court below in this matter made a specific finding
that the relationship between Swanson's counsel and the rest of the
lawyers with whom he shared an office and maintained an "of
counsel" relationship was in fact a "landlord/tenant" relationship.
(Tr. March 12, 1993, p. 38, In. 4-6). The court indicated that it
did not find the description "office sharing" appropriate. (Id. In.
6-8). Moreover, the court held that the "of counsel" designation
was "a slippery slope into an abyss of reasoning." (Id. p. 41, In.
1-3). However, throughout the hearings on the issue of Counsel's
relationship, he and the other lawyers in the office repeatedly and
consistently described their relationship as an "office sharing" or
"of counsel" relationship. It was only after testimony from Utah
State Bar Counsel Steve Trost stating his view that Counsel's
relationship did in fact create a conflict, that the trial court
recharacterized the nature of the relationship as landlord/tenant.
Regardless of the trial court's characterization, the facts remain
as set forth in Swanson's brief. Those facts are undisputed and
led Bar Counsel to reach his conclusion that defense counsel's
relationship did present an impermissible conflict. The testimony
of Mr. Trost is more fully discussed below.
9

STATE V. BROWN THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD POSSESS
UNDIVIDED LOYALTY TO HIS CLIENT,
In State

v.

Brown,

supra,

the Utah Supreme Court found that

defense counsel's employment as a part time prosecutor in a city
located in the same county as the pending criminal trial of
defense counsel's client jeopardized the defendant's right to
undivided loyalty of counsel.

In short, the court made clear

that where an attorney has prosecutorial responsibilities he or
she may not be appointed to defend indigent persons.

The court

noted that "to insure faith in the impartiality and integrity of
the justice system, the appearance of fairness and impartiality
in the adjudication process must be diligently maintained." Id.
at 858.

The court stated that when counsel has obligations to

individuals other than his or her client the undivided loyalty to
which defendants are entitled is compromised.

The court referred

to "unconscious influences" which may affect the vigorous
advocacy guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
are present here.

These same concerns

Counsel defends cases in the same county as

attorneys in his office who prosecute cases.

Thus, as is often

the case in rural counties, witnesses, particularly county law
enforcement officials, will be involved in concurrent cases.
Relationships or loyalties develop, certain treatment might be
expected or desired, concerns may exist preventing vigorous or
10

confrontive cross-examination.

Add to these factors the

circumstance where defense counsel is supervised in his duties as
a public defender by a senior attorney in his office and an
actual conflict exists.
The analysis of Brown

should extend to "of counsel" and

"office sharing" relationships.

Rule 1.10 of the Utah Rules of

Professional Conduct, admonishes that "[w]hile lawyers are
associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so" Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10.
(1992).

While the comment to Rule 1.10 excludes from the

definition of "firm" practitioners who share office space and
occasionally consult or assist each other, the comment makes
clear that "if they present themselves to the public in a way
suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm,
they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules."
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10 comment (1992).
Under the current facts, Swanson's counsel held himself out to
the public as a member of the "firm" by appearing with other firm
members in the local phone book, being included on the firm's
letterhead and sharing the firm's receptionists and support
staff.

Swanson believed he was a member of the firm and visited

him in the offices of the firm. (Tr. March 5, 1993, p. 24, In. 6-

11

19).

The fact that counsel characterized his relationship as "of

counsel" and somehow, therefore immune from a conflicts inquiry
is specifically rejected by numerous authorities.

The American

Bar Association in Formal Opinion 90-357 opined that the "of
Counsel" relationship
clearly means that the lawyer is "associated"
with each firm with which the lawyer is of
counsel. In consequence there is attribution
to the lawyer who is of counsel of all the
disqualifications of each firm, and,
correspondingly, attribution from the of
counsel to each firm, of each of those
disqualifications. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 357 (1990) .
Formal Opinion 90-357 also stated, "[t]here can be no doubt
that an of counsel lawyer (or firm) is 'associated in' and has an
'association with' the firm (or firms) to which the lawyer is of
counsel".

This statement led one pair of commentators to note

that the application of this opinion applies "for purposes of the
rules of imputation of disqualification". . ."[i]f one lawyer was
disqualified from representing a client because of a conflict of
interest, every partner and associate in the law firm was also
disqualified."

E.G.

Wren & B.J. Glasock, The of Counsel

Agreement—A Guide for Law Firm and Practitioner, ABA Senior
Lawyers Division (1991).

Thus, to state the obvious, given that

Swanson could not have been represented by the lawyer with
prosecutorial responsibilities in her defense counsel's office
12

likewise that very counsel should have been precluded from
representing her based on the imputed disqualification.

The

disqualification grew out of defense counsel's admitted of
counsel and office sharing relationship with the prosecutor.
The Utah Bar Ethics Committee has addressed this very
issue;

Utah Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 34 (1976).

This Bar Ethics opinion which was approved December 30, 1976
presented the following facts:
Three attorneys share office space under an office
sharing agreement, using what appears to be a firm
name with a single telephone number an address,
and with the names of each of the three along the
left margin of the letterhead. The relationship
is described as "an office-sharing partnership."
Numbered among the three is a deputy county
attorney who does criminal prosecutions and
practices privately, and an attorney who sits
periodically as municipal pro-tern judge.
Based on these facts the Bar Ethics Committee found that the
relationship delineated was "an office-sharing partnership".

The

opinion then set forth all relevant formal opinions and informal
decisions on which the ultimate conclusion of the ethics
committee relied.

That ultimate conclusion was:

"A lawyer may

not do what his partner, associate or one he shares office space
with may not do."

(A copy of this Ethics Opinion is attached

hereto as Attachment One.)

At the hearing before the trial court

addressing the conflicts question, Utah State Bar Counsel Steve
Trost emphasized the continuing validity of Ethics Opinion 34
13

stating "the policy considerations that were the underpinnings
for this rule are the same today as they were then.

And even

though the Disciplinary Rules have now been displaced by the
Rules of Professional Conduct, nonetheless, the corollary of this
rule, which is the present-day Rule 1.10, has the same
underpinnings." (Tr. March 12, 1993, p.18, In. 5-11). (Relevant
portions of Mr. Trost's testimony on the office-sharing
relationship involving Swanson's counsel are attached hereto as
Attachment Two.)
Similar to counsel in the Brown case, Swanson's counsel did
not provide undivided loyalty of counsel.

Swanson's counsel

maintained an "of counsel" or office-sharing relationship with a
firm that, at the time of Swanson's representation, had
prosecutorial responsibilities in Washington County, and had a
senior partner who is a Washington County Commissioner with
supervisory and funding power over both the Washington County
Prosecutor's office and the Public Defender.

As Steve Trost

testified regarding counsel's office relationship, "where there
is a defense counsel and a prosecutor in the same office, there
is the real potential for loyalties to be divided." Id. at p.23
In. 16-18.

"These loyalties can be divided by lack of

confidentiality through shared files, shared computer systems,
shared receptionists, shared staff and access to common
14

files...it is a significant problem.

And it is particularly

egregious when you have, as our court has chosen to focus on, a
serious criminal case." Id. In. 19-25, p.24, In.1-5.
Clearly, Swanson's defense counsel's relationship violated
Ethical Opinion 34 and resulted in compromising the undivided
loyalty which this court sought to so carefully guard in

Brown.

Swanson's counsel, throughout all trial court proceedings in this
matter described his relationship as one of "of counsel" or
office sharing.

Counsel was listed and pictured in the phone

book with other members of the firm; counsel was listed on the
firm's letterhead; in order to obtain access to counsel's office
an individual had to walk into the firm offices; counsel used the
firm's receptionists and support staff; counsel used an identical
phone number; moreover, no evidence was presented to indicate
that counsel did not have access to common files.

The comment to

rule 1.10 notes that if a lawyer has general access to files "it
should be inferred that such a lawyer is in fact privy to all
information about the firm's client.

Utah Rules of Professional

Conduct, Rule 1.10 comment (1992). These facts create exactly the
type of compromised relationship which results in a crisis of
confidence in the criminal justice system and in the ability of
indigent defendant's to receive adequate and untainted
representation.
15

III. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO SWANSON'S
CURRENT COUNSEL IS APPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF
WASHINGTON COUNTY'S BREACH OF IT'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO APPOINT EFFECTIVE
AND CONFLICT FREE COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT
DEFENDANT'S PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE
SECTION 77-32-1.
Utah Code § 77-32-1 sets forth the minimum

standards that a

county is responsible for following in providing indigent
defendant's counsel.

Section 77-32-1 (4) requires that the

county "assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel".

Subsection

five of that section requires the county to assure representation
in the taking of a first appeal of right.
(5) (1992).

Ut. Code Ann. 77-32-1

Washington County breached it's duty to supply to

Swanson loyal counsel.

Moreover, when the issue of a conflict

was raised, testified to and supported by authority, the county
continued to maintain it's original position that no conflict
existed.

Perhaps most troubling, the trial court assented to

this position, recharacterizing the relationship of defense
counsel in order to avoid reaching the obvious conclusion that a
disqualifying conflict was present.
Had Mr. Huntsman not assumed Swanson's defense and pursued
this appeal, the conflicted relationships would have continued.
Given Washington County's abdication of it's responsibility to
assure Swanson undivided loyalty which required her, of her own
volition to seek new counsel, the brunt of financial hardship
16

should not be Mr. Huntsman's to bear.

Mr. Huntsman stepped in

after the county failed to fulfill it's duty and after appointed
counsel provided services to Swanson under circumstances clearly
violative of Utah law, the ethical rules and Bar opinion.

It is

unrealistic to expect attorneys concerned about these issues to
affirmatively seek to rectify breaches of duty absent some
recompense for their effort.

The significant public policy

interests vindicated by this appeal and necessary after the
failure of Washington County to fulfill its obligations warrants
an award of fees to Mr. Huntsman.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment and relevant interpretations thereof by
the U.S Supreme Court, in addition to the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in State

v. Brown,

promise to criminal defendants the

right to effective and meaningful assistance of counsel.

That

promise is hollow if appointed counsel is allowed to maintain
relationships with other lawyers which create a conflict in
loyalty or compromise the ability or desire of counsel to
vigorously advocate on behalf of a client.

Amicus

respectfully

requests this court to fulfill the promise of the Brown decision
and assure to all criminal defendant's the impartial advocacy
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article I, § 12 of the Utah
Constitution.

Amicus respectfully requests the Court to extend
17

the Brown analysis and it's per se rule to cases where an
attorney undertakes representation of indigent defendants while
maintaining an office-sharing or "of Counsel" relationship with
attorneys who are prosecutors or who have funding or supervisory
power over the office of the public defender.

Moreover, Amicus

respectfully requests the court to award to Mr. Huntsman
attorneys fees expended in representing Swanson at hearing and in
this appeal.
Dated this

day of December, 1993.

KATHRYN D. KENDELL
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF
UTAH FOUNDATION, INC.
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Summary:
It is improper for lawyers to hold themselves out as
partners where no partnership relationship exists.
A lawyer may not do what his partner, associate or one he shares
office space with may not do.
An attorney may not appear before a pro-tern judge with whom
office space is shared and may not appear in any criminal matters in
that court.
Facts:

Three

attorneys

share

office

space

under

an office

sharing agreement, using what appears to be a firm name with a single
telephone number and address, and with the names of each of the three
along the left margin of your letterhead.

You describe the relation-

ship as "an office sharing partnership."
Numbered among the three is a deputy county attorney who does
criminal prosecutions and practices privately, and an attorney who
sits periodically as municipal pro-tern judge.
The questions you have posed are:
1.

Are the other

two attorneys

in the office precluded from

doing criminal work entirely, just as to state prosecutions, just as
to matters the deputy county attorney may be involved in, or not at
all?
2.

What, if any, limitation should be placed on the attorney

serving as a municipal pro tern judge, and what, if any, restrictions
should there be as to his associates appearing before him as a pro tern
judge or appearing before that court?

Your inquiries raise some important preliminary questions which
must

necessarily

be explored

prior

to

responding

to the specific

questions you have asked.
You have indicated in your background information that each of
you receives income only from your own clients and not from the work
of any other attorney in the office.
Opinion:

Rule IV, Canon 2, DR 2-102 (C) of the Utah Rules of

Professional Conduct indicates:
"A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in
fact partners."
The relationship you have delineated

in your letter which you

describe as "an office sharing partnership" is not in fact a partnership

but merely

an office sharing

arrangement.

In this

regard,

several ABA Ethics Opinions are pertinent.
Formal

Opinion

106

cited

with

approval

in

the ABA

Code of

Professional Responsibility under DR 2-102(C) passed directly on the
relationship, holding that it was improper for a group of attorneys to
hold themselves out as partners where no partnership existed but one
was the employer of the others named in the firm name.
Formal Opinion 115 held that two attorneys could not hold themselves out as partners when they were, in fact, attorneys in separate
states using a partnership name in both states and where each was
responsible for his own office expenses.
Formal Opinion 126 held that it was improper for lawyers sharing
office space to hold themselves out as partners under the name A, B
and C for the purpose of court appearances and signing pleadings when
in fact they were not partners.

Formal Opinion 277 held that it was improper for two attorneys in
different cities to hold themselves out as partners under the name of
Smith and Jonesf Attorneys at Law, when in fact what they had was a
referral arrangement only.
In Informal Decision 555, the question was asked whether two
attorneys might practice under a firm name where no real partnership
in

fact

exists

expenses*

and

when

they

are

in

reality

associates

sharing

The Committee stated unequivocally:

"This Committee has stated on numerous occasions that
it is improper for a group of lawyers to hold themselves out
as partners when no partnership relation in fact exists."
(citing the cases enumerated above)
We
rethink

think
your

it is incumbent upon the three of you to carefully
relationship,

since

it appears

likely

that you are

currently at cross purposes with DR 2-102(F).
A determination of partnership status is not, however material to
the questions you have raised, i.e., the interrelation of you as associates, having regard to the county prosecutor duties of one associate
and pro-tern judge status of the other.

If you were truly partners,

you would fall under the interdiction "that which one partner could
not do precludes all partners from undertaking to do."

(ABA Formal

Opinion 177, Informal Decisions C-493, 674, 691 and 855.)
The question then is, are persons sharing an office relationship
in a different position than those who are partners or associates of a
partnership?

Informal Opinion 855 holds that they are not.

opinion holds that:

The

". . . what a laywer cannot do, neither his partner,
his associate nor one with whom he shares offices may do."
This view is reinforced in Informal Opinion 995 where it is held
that two lawyers who share offices, although not partners, bear such a
close relation to one another that if one is precluded ethically from
representing a client then so also is the other*
With
specifics.

these

principles

as

guidelines,

let

us

examine

the

This Committee has held in Utah Opinion 26 that a pro-tern

judge may not appear as criminal defense counsel in the same court,
stating:
"Working with criminal court personnel and police, in
the close circumstances required in the judicial handling of
criminal matters, has an effect upon those persons which
would make it difficult for a police officer, for example,
to regard a pro-tern judge, acting as counsel, as he would
any other lawyer contending adversely to the case he is presenting to the court.
We think the appearance of impropriety and the potential for pressure on police personnel makes it inappropriate
for an attorney serving as a pro-tern judge in city court
criminal cases, on a not infrequent basis to also act as
defense counsel in city court criminal cases."
The Committee has also held in Utah Opinion 22 that county attorneys may not represent criminal defendants in other courts.
same effect is Utah Opinion 16.
a deputy.

To the

This interdiction applies equally to

(Utah Opinions 4 and 7.)

Neither of the remaining two could properly appear before the
pro-tern judge since he obviously could not do so.
appear

None of you may

in municipal court criminal matters since the pro-tern judge

would be precluded.

None of you could properly appear as counsel in

any civil matter arising out of a criminal matter in which either the
pro-tern judge or the deputy county prosecutor had involvement.

It follows, of course, that neither of the remaining

two may

represent the other side in civil litigation where one of you represents a party to the litigation.
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partnership relationship as office-sharing?
A.

Well, I would think at least if not more.

Because in office-sharing, you'd be prohibited from
indicating or holding yourself out as a member of a firm of
those other people you're office-sharing with; whereas, if
it's a true "of counsel" situation, then you could
generally put yourself on the letterhead and —

and

indicate you're of counsel.
Q.

Okay,

Could you have computers that interface?

A.

Sure.

Q.

And share secretaries with confidences and those

things?
A.

Well, again, it's a unique situation depending

on the association.
Q.

But —

but generally that's true.

So in light of that situation, would it be —

let me give you a hypothetical and ask you —
THE COURT:
hypothetical.

Counsel, you don't have to be

The rules don't require it.

facts that we've got.

Let's hear Mr. Trost's opinion.

MR. HUNTSMAN:
Q.

Lay out the

All right.

Well, that's —

If there were a situation —

let me give you the

situation that we have here with the firm of Gallian,
Westfall & Wilcox.
A.

I'm sorry?

Q.

Okay.

I didn't hear that.

We have a firm called Gallian, Westfall &

TJATTT

r*
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Wilcox.
A.

Okay.

Q.

Now, the only facts we have before this court

are these.
facts.

Although lately I've been aware of additional

But let me just give you these.
The firm includes an associate named John

Hummel, who prosecute —
the city of Ivins.

who does prosecutorial work for

Senior partner Russ Gallian is the city

attorney for the city of Ivins. Also a county commissioner
with budgetary and other powers and influence in regulation
of among other things the public defender's office,
prosecutor's office, sheriff, jail, and those things. And
we have with that firm —
facts —

now, taking it with only those

two other attorneys, MacArthur Wright and his son

Jonathan Wright, who hold themselves out as "of counsel" in
some publications, at least. And in this situation, as I
understand the facts, the only door designation, if you
were to walk into the office, says "Gallian, Westfall &
Wilcox."

Nothing about Mr. Wright.

They share "cne same

stationery; have computers that interface.
a half-time secretary.

Mr. Wright has

The other half of the time, she

does work for the Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox firm and is
privy to their confidences.

They share the same phone —

telephone number and are on stationery together, although
current stationery —

and I believe —

well, the stationery

22
1

at least at all relevant times here does suggest —

2

indicate an "of counsel" relationship.

3

THE COURT:

does

Counsel, I'm going to hand to

4

Mr. Trost —

if you don't have a problem —

5

the stationery; Exhibit No. 1, the telephone ad that

6

doesn't show "of counsel"; and Exhibit No. 3, the telephone

7

ad that does show.

8

Do you want him to look at those?

9

MR. HUNTSMAN:

10

THE COURT:

11

THE WITNESS:

12

Q.

Exhibit No. 2,

Yes, sir.

Let's let him see them.
Okay.

BY MR. HUNTSMAN:

Now, with that in —

in mindf

13

and based on your understanding of DR 1.10 and of published

14

Opinion No. 34 and the other laws and regulations that are

15

applicable, would you say that it would be proper and

16

appropriate for Mr. Wright to do public defender work in

17

Utah for a political subdivision of the state if

18

Mr. Gallian or Mr. Hummel could not?

19

A.

My opinion would be that it would not be

20

proper.

21

you'd like me to tell you why, I would.

That it would be a violation of Rule 110.

22

Q.

Yes.

Yes.

23

A.

There's two concerns•

If

Would you, please.
One is dealing with the

24

indicia of a firm which would appear to have and which

25

would be consistent and prohibitive under 1.10 in the

—

23
the prior rules based upon what's —

what's in the

photograph in the yellow pages and the letterhead
indicating "of counsel."
The second and —

and probably more compelling

reason is the —

the public policy reason behind all the

conflict Rules.

1.7, prohibiting conflicts between current

clients; 1.8, prohibitive transaction with clients; 1.9,
prohibitive conflicts between a current client or a former
client; and 1.10, the imputed disqualification of loyalty.
And it's —

it's an undivided, unfettered type of loyalty

that the attorney must demonstrate and show to his client.
The courts that have commented on this, and the
commentators that have commented on this have all
universally felt that —
this as —

and, of course, our court has felt

as exhibited in Brown —

very —

very strongly

stated this, that where there is a defense counsel and a
prosecutor in the same office, there is the real potential
for loyalties to be divided.
Those loyalties can be divided due to a number
of circumstances.

The confidences of the client can be

compromised because of the access to the files —
files —

to common

unless there's evidence that they are secure. The

confidences in terms of phone messages and sharing staff
and staff being aware of —
the —

of the different positions of

of the State and the —

or excuse me —

of the

24
prosecution and the defense is a very real problem.
there's —

it's —

So

it's more than just an appearance or —

or an illusory problem.

It is a —

a significant problem.

And it is particularly egregious when you have, as our
court has chosen to focus on a —
Q.

a serious criminal case.

So there might be a tendency for a —

let's say

a public defender to not want to offend someone who works
with budgets or with sheriff's deputies
A.

Right.

Q.

—

—

who might he be cross-examining?

That sort

of thing?
A.

That's right.

Q.

All right.

A.

It may even be a subconscious type of thing.

You know, he may not feel that he wants to as aggressively
cross-examine his partner's witness as if he would a —
some other lawyer's witness.
Q.

Okay.

Let me ask you this, Mr. Trost.

And I

appreciate your comment on that.
Are you aware of the —

the reasons why in the

Brown case the Supreme Court determined that cases should
not necessarily have to be heard on an individual fact
basis?

That there's a per se rule of reversal.

any reason particularly for that?
sometimes really different?

Aren't —

Is there

aren't cases

